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Draft Decision 
on changes to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly with a view to accommodating 
associate members and associate partners of WEU 
The Assembly, 
(i) Having taken note of the arrangements agreed between the WEU Council and associate members of 
this organisation on the one hand and between the Council and associate partners on the other; 
(ii) Anxious to receive in appropriate conditions representatives of associate member and associate 
partners of WEU and to take account of the wishes expressed in this respect by the Council on 9th May 
1994; 
(iii) Recalling that Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty empowers the Assembly, composed of 
representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the (Parliamentary) Assembly of the Council of Europe 
to examine the annual report on the WEU Council's activities; 
( iv) Considering that the representatives of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance must have a 
more favourable status than that of countries which are not members of that alliance, 
DECIDES 
I. To amend its Charter as follows: 
In Article II (c) of the Charter of the Assembly, delete " without voting rights in plenary sessions "; 
Il. To amend its Rules of Procedure as follows: 
1. In Rule 15.3, delete" without voting rights" and insert" and deliberate"; 
2. In Rule 17, add a new paragraph (h) to read as follows: 
" Rules 50 and 51 on budgetary questions shall not apply to representatives of associate member 
countries. " 
Former paragraph (h) becomes paragraph (i). 
3. In Rule 41, paragraph 2, delete" fourth". After" the United Kingdom (5)" add a new sentence to 
read as follows: " The fourth permanent committee shall be composed of 28 members divided as follows: 
Belgium (2), France (4), Germany (4), Greece (2), Italy (4), Luxembourg (1), the Netherlands (2), Portu-
gal (2), Spain (3), United Kingdom (4)." 
4. In Rule 18 on observers, number the existing paragraph (a) and add two new paragraphs as follows: 
" (b) Representatives of parliaments of WEU observer and associate partner countries to the 
Assembly shall have permanent observer status. 
(c) Permanent observers of associate partner countries shall sit in committees without voting rights. 
The Presidential Committee shall fix the number of their representatives in sessions and in com-
mittees and the way they shall participate in the activities of the Assembly. " 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur) 
1. The Committee on Rules of Procedure and 
Privileges has had the task of making proposals to 
the Assembly so as to set out the voting rights of 
associate members. In spite of three attempts, it 
has not been possible to reach fmality, and since 
work began as long ago as 1993, a category of 
associate partner has been created. 
2. It is a matter of regret that these new forms 
of membership, associate member, observer and 
partner, were created by the Council of Ministers 
without any form of prior consultation with the 
Assembly. Common courtesy - and common 
sense - would surely have dictated this course of 
action so that the Assembly, which is an integral 
part ofWEU, could have given some preliminary 
thought to the subject. The fact that the associate 
partner status followed on merely compounded 
- and confused - the situation and prior consulta-
tions with the Presidential Committee should 
have been held. 
3. Too much time has already been wasted in 
fruitless discussion on issues which have no direct 
bearing upon the duty given to the Committee on 
Rules of Procedure and Privileges, and unless the 
Assembly is to look incompetent and incapable of 
resolving these issues swiftly, decisions must now 
be taken. 
4. It may be argued that we start from a deci-
sion taken earlier and which has, to some extent, 
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been overtaken by events, but the Assembly is 
master of its own procedure and cannot continue 
pursuing fruitless points any longer. 
5. It seems pointless to rehearse at length the 
history of what has happened to earlier recom-
mendations of the Committee on Rules of Proce-
dure and Privileges as many events have been 
overtaken. 
6. Logic and common sense dictate the follow-
ing: 
1. Full members have all rights accorded to 
them in the charter, statute and rules. 
2. Associate members must, therefore, 
have less rights than full members. 
3. Associate partners have, therefore, to be 
given less rights than associate members. 
7. Thus, I suggest that associate members 
should possess full rights in committees and ple-
nary sessions including voting, except upon bud-
getary matters and on the reply to the annual 
report of the Council. 
8. Associate partners shall be entitled to 
attend and speak at committees and in plenary but 
without voting rights. 
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APPENDIX 
Voting rights of associate members in the WEU Assembly 1 
prepared at the request of the Clerk of the Assembly 
distributed at the request of Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur 
1. Should representatives of associate mem-
bers in the WEU Assembly have voting rights 
there? Does their status, as defmed by the various 
acts of the WEU Council of Ministers, grant them 
the right to speak and vote? 
It is proposed to examine this question 
from a strictly legal standpoint; a political assess-
ment of such matters falls outside the aims and 
scope of this study. 
2. In order to be able to answer this question, 
it must first be established which rules of law are 
applicable and their sources. These sources are: 
(a) The 1954 modified Brussels Treaty; 
(b) The 1991 Maastricht declaration of the 
Brussels Treaty powers on the invita-
tion to European members of NATO to 
become associate members of WEU; 
(c) The Petersberg declaration of 19th June 
1992 on relations between WEU and 
the other European member states of 
the European Union or the Atlantic 
Alliance; 
(d) The document on associate member-
ship approved at the WEU Ministerial 
Council on 20th November 1992 and 
given substance on the same date by the 
adoption of a text called the document 
on associate membership of WEU 
concerning the Republic of Iceland, the 
Kingdom of Norway and the Republic 
of Turkey, by the ministers for foreign 
affairs of the latter three countries and 
the countries known as the Brussels 
Treaty powers. The content of this 
document was supplemented by an 
addendum inserted in the minutes of 
the above meeting of the WEU Minis-
terial Council on 20th November 1992 
in connection with the document on 
associate membership; 
1. Legal opinion by Professor Henri Adam, fonner legal spe-
cialist with the Council of Europe and the United Nations 
(UNCTAD). 
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(e) The Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 
1994 of the countries known as the 
Brussels Treaty powers " following on 
from the document on associate mem-
bership of 20th November 1992 ". 
3. The Brussels Treaty obviously does not 
contain rules governing associate member status. 
Moreover, the document adopted in Rome stipu-
lated (in paragraph 3) that it would not involve 
any modification of the Brussels Treaty. Further-
more, the Council of Ministers, in its answer to 
the Assembly's Written Question 300, recalled 
the terms of the Petersberg declaration according 
to which associate members had not become 
contracting parties to the Brussels Treaty. Howe-
ver, it cannot be adduced from the foregoing that 
the modified Brussels Treaty has no application 
whatsoever in relations between the afore-
mentioned powers and associate members, once 
the former have acted and agreed relations with 
members styled as associate, in accordance with 
and by application of the said treaty. 
Furthermore, given that the " document " 
expressed a reservation as to the application of 
Article vm of the treaty, is any interpretation pos-
sible other than that the remaining provisions are 
exempted from the reservation? 
4. It should also be noted that the Brussels 
Treaty of 17th March 1948, following its revision 
on 23rd October 1954, became the founding docu-
ment, the charter, of an international organisation 
(Articles Vill and IX). The high contracting Parties 
became members of WEU, with a system, an 
ordering of relations which ceased to be contractual 
and instead became organisational or institutional, 
at least as far as relations stemming from certain 
provisions of the aforementioned treaty were 
concerned. Thus when referring to the status of 
associate member we should not lose sight of this 
change, brought about, in part at least, in the rela-
tions between the signatories of the Brussels Trea-
ty. It might be appropriate to place the status of 
associate member in this new context of the Brus-
sels Treaty, in accordance with Article 31.2.a of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
5. It would be legally erroneous to claim that 
associate members are and should remain apart 
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from the Brussels Treaty, the charter of an interna-
tional organisation, of which they are now mem-
bers - albeit associate members - but members 
nevertheless. It would be difficult to argue that 
associate members have no relational rights with 
the contracting parties to the Brussels Treaty, when 
there is no legal basis for the organisation known 
as WEU other than the abovementioned treaty. 
How could they have been invited to become asso-
ciate members of an organisation, in other words 
to become part of it, while not being, in principle at 
least, parties to the founding legal documents by 
means of which it is governed (inter alios acta)? 
6. Such an interpretation might encounter 
several difficulties: first, the principle of good 
faith in interpreting international agreements 
(Article 31.1 of the convention referred to above); 
second, the link established between the Brussels 
Treaty and the invitation to become an associate 
member of WEU and acceptance thereof. This 
link was expressly underlined by the WEU Coun-
cil of Ministers in its answer to the Assembly's 
Written Question 300 (end paragraph 4). Indeed, 
according to the aforementioned answer the invi-
tation to become an associate member was based 
on the principle laid down in the preamble of the 
Brussels Treaty to the effect that the contracting 
parties were resolved to promote the unity and 
encourage the progressive integration of Europe. 
Because of this reference to the Brussels Treaty, it 
becomes very difficult to sustain the thesis of the 
absence of any connection between associate 
members and the Brussels Treaty. 
7. Lastly, the links between associate mem-
bers and the Brussels Treaty follow from the 
concept, expressed by an image, of WEU as the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. The idea 
of the " European pillar " has been taken up and 
repeated, starting with The Hague platform (27th 
October 1987), in the Maastricht declaration (lOth 
December 1991), the Petersberg declaration (19th 
June 1992), the Rome declaration (20th Novem-
ber 1992) and in the document of the same date 
adopted in Rome and finally in the Kirchberg 
declaration of 9th May 1994. This concept domi-
nates relations with associate members, who are 
all necessarily members of the Atlantic Alliance, 
and members ofWEU. From this established link 
the latter has deduced two legal consequences: 
first the inapplicability of Article V of the Brus-
sels Treaty in relations between members of WEU 
and members of NATO that have become asso-
ciate members (Petersberg declaration); and 
second the reciprocal strengthening of the securi-
ty guarantees and defence commitments under 
Article V of the Brussels Treaty and Article 5 of 
the Treaty of Washington as stated in the Kirch-
berg declaration of 9th May 1994. 
8. It is clear that, in rejecting any formalist 
approach, any literal method of interpreting the 
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Brussels Treaty, the contracting parties have 
expressed their intention of allowing associate 
members to benefit from military and other assis-
tance under Article V, on the basis of their assis-
tance obligations under Article 5 of the Treaty of 
Washington. It is by the technical procedure of 
referring back to the latter that the Brussels Treaty 
is to be interpreted and applied. Hence associate 
members might be defended and assisted, in the 
event of their being the victims of aggression, in 
the same conditions as WEU member states 2• 
Such is the plausible legal interpretation of the 
concept expressed by the image of WEU as the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. 
9. Thus one notes the successive contra-
dictory interpretations of the Brussels Treaty 
within the space of two years, between Peterberg 
and Kirchberg, doubtless corresponding to the 
evolution of the concept of European defence, 
governed by a notion that the latter should be res-
tricted solely to the Community that seems to have 
developed from one declaration to the next. All 
these changes are occurring because Article vm 
of the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 had made 
two alterations to the legal regime of the treaty: 
First, it had transformed contractual rela-
tions into institutional and organisational rela-
tions, and this modification allowed expressly for 
a power of implementation, on the basis of inter-
pretations of the Brussels Treaty, which could not 
otherwise have existed, at least as an attribute of 
an organisation or a function of an institution. 
10. Then the progressive integration of Europe, 
initially a ground for the Brussels Treaty powers, 
became a power, an area of responsibility of WEU 
- enshrined not only in the preamble but also in 
the substantive text of the treaty. Therefore, 
through the exercise of a responsibility conferred 
on WEU under Article IV of the protocol signed 
in Paris on 23rd October 1954, and again referred 
to under Article VIII of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, it has been possible to define the legal 
position of the European states not parties to the 
Brussels Treaty and create an associate member 
status, entirely outside any procedure for revising 
the Brussels Treaty. 
11. It should be noted that the Brussels Treaty 
did not provide for any procedure for its revision 
except in the case of new members acceding to 
the treaty. A revision was brought about in the 
protocol of accession of Greece, signed in Rome 
on 20th November 1992 following insertion of a 
reference in Part ill, A, of the Petersberg declara-
2. There is an expressed intention to apply the procedures 
laid down in Article V of the Brussels Treaty in implement-
ing Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington. The associate 
members having noted this expressed intention, an interna-
tional agreement was thereby concluded. It remains to be 
seen whether reciprocity applies in the absence of a declara-
tion on the part of the associate members. 
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tion to prevent that state having the benefit of 
Article V in its differences with NATO member 
states 3• Thus, in the absence of any provision for 
revision of the Brussels Treaty, the latter operated 
implicitly in the three cases mentioned (taking 
account of those referred to in the footnote 
below). The contracting parties therefore applied 
Article 39 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, adopted in Vienna on 22nd 
May 1969. 
12. It is also noteworthy that the Brussels 
Treaty was also modified, not only implicitly or 
by an ad hoc revision procedure, but also by way 
of interpretation contrary to law (contra legem) in 
its application. This precedent is that of the trans-
fer of the exercise of WEU's responsibilities in 
social and cultural matters to the Council of 
Europe in 1959. 
13. In a communication to the Assembly of 
WEU dated 24th April 1959 (Document 987), the 
Ministerial Council notified it of the transfer deci-
sion as follows: " The exercise of the powers of 
WEU in the social and cultural fields will be 
transferred to the Council of Europe ... " (Assem-
bly Document 149, paragraph 13). The Assembly 
protested against this decision, which was not 
merely a violation but also a revision of the Brus-
sels Treaty, specifically of Article 11, from the 
moment WEU relinquished, in favour of another 
organisation, the exercise of responsibilities 
assigned to it under its Charter, its founding docu-
ment (Document 149, paragraph 33). This reduc-
tion in WEU's statutory activities was therefore 
denounced on grounds of respect for the treaty. 
However, the Council of Ministers chal-
lenged the Assembly's competence in this matter. 
It informed the Assembly that it considered the 
transfer decision wholly valid and as falling 
within the scope of Article Vlli.1 which provides 
that the Council may consider matters concerning 
the execution of the treaty and of its protocols and 
annexes (Document 149, paragraph 50). 
14. This constitutes an application of the rules 
provided for under the Vienna Convention refer-
red to above. In point of fact, according to Article 
31.3 of the latter, the content of a treaty is not 
limited to its text. It also includes " any subse-
quent agreement between the parties regarding 
the interpretation of the treaty or the application 
of its provisions" [sub-paragraph (a)]. Similarly, 
any subsequent practice in the application of the 
3. It should be noted that the protocols of accession of Greece, 
Portugal and Spain had revised Article XII of the Brussels 
Treaty, which provided that any state invited to accede to the 
treaty became party to it by depositing an instrument of 
accession with the Belgian Government. However, the afore-
mentioned protocols dated accession from the date of receipt 
of the last ratification, acceptance or approval, notified to the 
Belgian Government. 
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treaty may be considered as supplementing the 
content of the latter modifying the very text of the 
agreement (see Article 31.3 sub-paragraph (b) of 
the above United Nations Convention). Thus the 
1959 precedent of relinquishing the exercise of 
WEU's social and cultural activities illustrates the 
extent of the Council of Ministers' powers of 
interpretation and revision. 
15. To the power generated by the dynamics of 
the contractual relationship, well described in 
Article 31 of the United Nations Convention, 
must be added the implicit powers inherent in 
international institutions which make it necessary 
to resort to a functional rather than a textual inter-
pretation of the treaty. 
Indeed, by taking up, in the 1954 revision, 
in the substantive text of the Brussels Treaty the 
function provided for in its preamble, namely the 
adoption of the necessary measures to promote 
the unity and encourage the progressive integra-
tion of Europe (new Article Vlli) the Council was 
provided with the necessary implicit and functio-
nal powers to encourage such unity and promote 
integration of Europe extending beyond the fron-
tiers of the Brussels Treaty powers. The proce-
dure to be followed to this end involves, not 
signature and ratification of protocols, but a 
Council decision taken in conformity with the 
provisions of the treaty wherein lies its substance 
(Article Vlli). 
16. There is no need whatsoever for the 
Brussels Treaty to have instituted an associate 
member status for European allied states that are 
not Brussels Treaty powers to join WEU, by una-
nimous decision of the Council of Ministers, as 
associate members, under a status defmed also by 
the Council of Ministers, from the moment it is a 
measure adopted for the purpose of" encouraging 
the progressive integration of Europe " whose 
limits extend far beyond Western Europe. 
It is precisely the Europe that stretches to 
the East and North of the most westerly point of 
the continent to which the status of associate 
member is directed as an instrument of unity and 
progressive integration. 
Associate members or partners may there-
fore be admitted to WEU without revision of the 
Brussels Treaty by virtue of the powers expressly 
and implicitly acknowledged as belonging to the 
Council of Ministers. 
17. However, these powers are limited, first by 
the purposes attributed to their exercise and then 
by the unanimity required in each case for the 
adoption of the measures envisaged. Furthermore 
let us add, for the record, without insisting overly 
upon it, that since the treaty provides for a revi-
sion procedure only with regard to the accession 
of members, it follows that the treaty does not 
require signature or ratification of an international 
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agreement, the theory of the contrary act 4 apart, 
for the creation of a WEU associate member sta-
tus, the Council of Ministers having to this end the 
necessary powers and competences at its disposal. 
18. Associate member status was defined by 
the declarations adopted by the Council of Minis-
ters (Petersberg, Kirchberg and Maastricht) and 
given substance, and its content enriched, in the 
various " documents " adopted in Rome. It should 
be noted that these declarations and documents 
are in no way what are termed political docu-
ments, with no binding effects or consequences 
for conferring status or developing subjective 
legal positions [in this respect, see the judgment 
of the International Court of Justice of 1st July 
1994 in a case between Qatar and Bahrein, para-
graph 25 (2)]. 
19. This is the case despite the idiosyncratic 
form of these instruments. The document on asso-
ciate membership was not in the conventional 
form of a bilateral or multilateral instrument bet-
ween contracting parties. The document was sub-
ject first to an approval procedure by the WEU 
Council of Ministers, meeting iru Rome on 22nd 
November 1992. The same document was then 
adopted at the joint meeting, also held in Rome on 
the same day, of the ministers for foreign affairs 
of WEU member states (acting irudividually) with 
the ministers for foreign affairs of the three states 
which had accepted the invitation in the Maas-
tricht declaration to become associate members of 
WEU. 
20. Admittedly, there was also to be a second 
approval by the WEU Council of Ministers, 
which met after the joint meetirug of the twelve 
ministers referred to (9 + 3), according to minutes 
summarising the discussions between the twelve 
ministers and providing a material record of the 
agreements reached during these discussions. 
These oral agreements became written ones by 
being referred to in the abovementioned minutes 
of the Council of Ministers and through their phy-
sicallink: with the document by the publication of 
the latter as an addendum, as an instrument 
(minutes), approved in connection with the docu-
ment on associate members. 
21. To this document, in turn approved, adop-
ted and supplemented by approved minutes, was 
added a declaration by the WEU Council of 
Ministers, meeting at Kirchberg on 9th May 1994, 
entitled: Declaration following on from the docu-
4. The applicability of the contrary act theory is debatable in 
the present case where an international organisation is invol-
ved. The law on international organisations makes provision 
for admissions and accessions without revision of the foun-
ding treaty. Article XI of the Brussels Treaty, which consti-
tutes a departure from this, may be explained by the idea of 
various forms of accession to a system which has remained 
essentially contractual. 
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ment on associate membership of 20th November 
1992. The statutory implications of this new 
declaration of the Council of Ministers cannot be 
challenged, nor can its juridical value, its binding 
commitment be denied. Third states, beneficiaries 
of these declarations having accepted and acted in 
conformity with the provisions of the declaration, 
international agreement is thus established bet-
ween the authors and beneficiaries of these decla-
rations without further joint adoption procedure 
as there had been at Rome, at a meeting which, 
moreover, will not be held. 
22. If there is the slightest doubt about the 
contractual nature of the process followed, one 
only has to refer to the above minutes signed in 
Rome which state: " The document on associate 
members cannot be modified without the assent of 
the associate members" (Addendum, final sen-
tence). 
Similarly, the Kirchberg declaration, which 
can be likened to a second addendum, contained 
not in the minutes but in a declaration, includes a 
provision which reads as follows: " Ministers 
confirm that the arrangements contained in the 
present declaration cannot be modified without 
the consent of the associate members " (penulti-
mate paragraph of the declaration). 
An agreement undeniably exists between 
the members of WEU (not WEU as such) and its 
associate members that are not full members, in 
other words contracting parties to the Brussels 
Treaty (in the strict sense of the latter) defining 
the legal status of these associate members. This 
agreement is inviolable and cannot be amended 
unilaterally. It is an instrument containing interna-
tional commitments within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 1 of the abovementioned convention. Thus, 
the International Court of Justice, in its decision 
of 1st July 1994 in the case between Qatar and 
Bahrein, gave relative value to the importance of 
form in bearing out an international agreement by 
referring to the Vienna Convention (see paragraph 
23 of the abovementioned decision). 
23. The absence of a signature at the bottom of 
the document or of its subsequent ratification, in 
other words the procedure normally followed for 
concluding international agreements, does not 
detract in any way from the binding juridical natu-
re of the untitled instrument that has been called 
the" document". This is the case in as much as 
the states concerned had agreed that the process 
used should express their consent to be bound by 
the status thus defined (See Article 11 of the afore-
mentioned Convention on the Law of Treaties). 
24. We have here an international agreement 
governed by the principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
It must be executed in good faith by all the states 
concerned or involved (Article 29 of the same 
convention). The procedure employed, the forms 
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of expression used, the names given to the instru-
ments drawn up have little influence on the 
content of the agreement and the consent given. A 
particular diplomatic context which, as we have 
noted, has evolved with the progression from one 
declaration to the next, Petersberg to Kirchberg, 
and certain reservations in national opinions over 
contracting new alliance obligations and offering 
new military assistance guarantees, seemingly 
explain the peculiarities of the procedures, names 
and definitions used to describe the relations bet-
ween WEU and NATO and the status of associate 
members of the European members of the latter 
organisation vis-a-vis WEU. However, legal ana-
lyses enable one to see clearly that the " docu-
ments " adopted are definitely international 
agreements or treaties. Similarly it is possible to 
build up an entire regime of legal relations for the 
states known as associate members of WEU, 
without revising the Brussels Treaty, from the 
moment the institutional competences acquired 
by the Brussels Treaty powers can be exercised 
for the purposes of creating an associate member 
status in WEU. 
25. The first question raised by such a status 
concerns its content. What are the rights of asso-
ciate members in WEU? These rights obviously 
do not derive from the Brussels Treaty which did 
not provide for such a status, nor furthermore for 
member status, since the establishment of WEU 
as an international organisation was based on the 
new Article Vlll of the treaty and as a result of 
decisions taken by each of the two bodies that 
were created, namely the Council of Ministers 
and the parliamentary Assembly. 
26. The 1948 Brussels Treaty did not provide 
for full member status, much less therefore for 
that of associate member. Member status as an 
institutional status is the outcome of a succession 
of decisions taken by the Council of Ministers 
since its creation by the protocol signed in Paris 
on 23rd October 1954. This member status, which 
is of a" jurisprudential "nature reflects the condi-
tions under which the international organisation, 
WEU, was created. At the outset this had, proper-
ly speaking, no founding document or charter. It 
found legal support in a new provision inserted in 
a treaty which had provided only for contractual, 
but certainly not institutional, relations between 
the parties. The entire organisational and institu-
tional framework, including the status of (need-
less to say full) member is the product of a series 
of decisions adopted by the Council of Ministers, 
established as the principal and indeed to a certain 
extent the constituent body of WEU in accord-
ance with the (new) article of the Brussels Treaty. 
27. Obligations of members of WEU are not 
identical to those of the contracting parties of the 
Brussels Treaty. The latter obligations derive from 
the text of the treaty itself while the former 
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include, additionally, what is known as a derived 
right, arising from the exercise of the powers of 
the organisation under its statutes 5• The standing 
of member is not completely merged with that of 
contracting party. The same applies to joining 
WEU as compared with accession to the treaty. It 
should be noted furthermore that an important 
part of the organisation, namely its budget - the 
contributions which members are bound to make 
and which are necessarily voted by national par-
liaments - has its legal origin in the competences 
and powers granted to the Council of Ministers. 
28. By keeping exclusively to the text of the 
treaty whose ratification they had authorised, 
could national parliaments refuse to approve the 
necessary sums to pay the contributions to WEU's 
budget? They could not. For with the changes and 
the transformations that have occurred between 
the Brussels Treaty powers from the fact of the 
creation of an organisation (WEU), this seems 
hardly possible. One might even wonder how 
Article V might be applied given the transforma-
tion of relations from contractual to organisational 
and institutional. In-depth consideration should 
certainly be given to this issue. 
29. What can be the content of associate mem-
ber status? Any answer to this question must start 
from full member status. Reference in this 
connection must be twofold: first, the source of 
that status and then its content. 
30. First, the source. Full member status has 
been largely defmed by decisions of the Council 
of Ministers. The Brussels Treaty applies mutatis 
mutandis in this definition, which for the rest 
derives from the decisions and jurisprudence of 
the Council of Ministers. It goes without saying 
that the same must necessarily apply to the defmi-
tion of associate member status. This is, more-
over, what happened with the successive declara-
tions adopted by the Council, at Maastricht, 
Petersberg, Rome and fmally at Kirchberg. The 
source of the status is identical 6 in both cases too: 
the Council of Ministers as the WEU's principal 
organ has the necessary powers to define the 
content of WEU member and associate member 
status; but with one difference, however: full 
member status is fixed and modified by the exer-
cise of a " regulatory " power of the Council of 
Ministers within the organisation as a whole, 
whereas for associate members there is a further 
contractual element in addition to this regulatory 
dimension. The same process is employed at least 
in part in respect of associate members as that 
5. The Council's competence to consider matters relating to 
the application and not just the application of the treaty. 
(Article Vlll, paragraph 1 of the Brussels Treaty.) 
6. The establishment of an organisational system obviously 
has not had the effect of making obsolete the purely contrac-
tual provisions of the treaty. 
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used for members that have acceded to the treaty, 
whose status is determined contractually, in full, 
between them and the Council of Ministers by 
institutionalised application of Article XI of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. 
31. Second, the reference also applies in defm-
ing the content of the status of associate member. 
Indeed the very notion of associate member 
requires differentiation of the respective content 
of member and associate member status. The 
rights and duties implied by the latter will be of 
lesser scope than the rights and duties implied by 
the former. 
This differentiation is dependent on the 
decisions adopted by the Council of Ministers and 
does not in any sense derive from the fact that 
associate members would not be party to the 
Brussels Treaty since everything, or almost every-
thing, is conducted at organisational level, at the 
level of the organisation of the alliance and not at 
the level of the Brussels Treaty as the legal basis 
ofWEU. 
32. The principle on which the status of asso-
ciate member is based was set out at Maastricht 
and Petersberg and given substance in the Rome 
document: namely full participation in WEU's 
activities. It follows that non participation is the 
exception and as such must result specifically 
from a special decision of the Council of Minis-
ters. All this is the logical consequence of a fun-
damental rule according to which a European 
defence identity must be compatible with the 
Atlantic Alliance. Thus any departure from the 
principle of full participation conflicts with this 
requirement for compatibility. It represents the 
trade-off offered to the European allies of the 
Atlantic Alliance, not members of the European 
Union, for the development of WEU as the de-
fence component of the latter without weakening 
the said alliance. The principle is therefore the 
commitment by associate members to participate 
fully in WEU's activities. 
33. In the" document" the Council of Minis-
ters introduced certain limitations to this partici-
pation, although not to the commitment which is 
the basic component of associate member status. 
There was first the limitation on participation in 
WEU's main organ, the Council of Ministers. In 
the first place the latter might meet without the 
participation of associate members, if a majority 
of member states, possibly determined by the cast-
ing vote ofthe Chairman, decides to hold a meet-
ing among themselves without the associate 
members. They will have the right to speak ex 
officio. They will also have voting rights but these 
will be of limited effect. Their votes will be of no 
significance if, from the outset, there is unanimity 
or a consensus among the full members. They 
therefore have the right to vote but no right of 
veto, while full members can each, individually, 
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block a unanimous decision, a consensus reached 
among the other members, unless the decision 
concerns a matter to which another (majority) 
voting procedure applies or for which one has 
been agreed. In such cases, by virtue of their sta-
tus the votes of associate members would automa-
tically be taken into account. In general they could 
participate in implementing the decisions adopted 
unless a majority of full members, or half their 
number with the casting vote of the President, 
objected. 
34. An ambiguity should be noted in the rules 
on the voting rights of associate members. The 
" document " (par. 3) refers to their association in 
decisions taken by member states. Does this mean 
in all decisions of the Council or those taken when 
they are excluded from voting or when they are 
manifestly opposed by a consensus? It would 
indeed appear that the cases when it would be 
possible for them to be associated in a decision 
are those when decisions are adopted in their 
absence (when they have been excluded from the 
meeting) or adopted in their presence but without 
their supporting vote but, having subsequently 
changed their minds, they then had reason to sup-
port the majority or consensus position previously 
reached by the full members. 
35. This was the decision-making process the 
principle of which the WEU Council of Ministers 
had sanctioned when transferring the exercise of 
its social and cultural activities to the Council of 
Europe in 1959 (see paragraph 14)- the so-called 
partial agreement procedure established in Reso-
lution (51) 62 of the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe. This process enables unity 
and cohesion to be maintained among the mem-
bers of the Council of Europe when there is no 
unanimity and there are divisions among mem-
bers, some wishing to go ahead and others oppo-
sed to such a course. In such event, the resolution 
enables the decision on which members are not 
unanimous to be adopted, but only by those who 
are in favour, all its implications, including those 
relating to expenditure, being assumed by them. 
However, those who were opposed continue to be 
informed of the progress of work undertaken on 
behalf of the Council of Europe under the so-
called partial agreement arrangement. The latter 
are also able to be associated subsequently with 
the action taken in accordance with the partial 
agreement system and also with the agreements 
themselves. Hence the Council of Europe's re-
establishment fund for refugees and surplus popu-
lations was created with a limited number of 
member states and subsequently extended to other 
member states who changed their position on this 
fund. They were associated with the decision 
creating the fund. 
36. This association of associate members in 
certain decisions or in their implementation, as 
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provided for in the " document ", is clearly based 
on the idea of partial agreements. It meets the 
same need for unity in the organisation and acts as 
a corrective to the same consequences of exclu-
ding those in the minority. It is an institutional 
remedy in the voting system. There is no other 
obvious explanation for the " document's " ambi-
guity. 
37. Other restrictions on full participation by 
associate members in decisions and actions of 
WEU have been provided for expressly and are 
set out in the " document ". 
They concern the Planning Cell, communi-
cations (WEUCOM) and budget contributions. 
However matters regarding space and the activi-
ties in which associate members participate 
already, the latter have been placed on an equal 
footing with new members (at least until the end 
of the experimental period) or full members. This 
is for reasons of institutional continuity. In any 
event their participation in military operations 
with commitment of forces is on the same basis as 
full members, including forces' security, planning 
and associated exercises. 
And, emphasising the evolving nature of 
this status, the Council had no hesitation in deci-
ding at Kirchberg to withdraw the restrictions on 
participation in the Planning Cell. Associate 
members henceforth participate not from the out-
side, through liaison officers, but from the inside 
through their own officers within the Cell. 
38. Moreover, in order to allow associate part-
ners the fullest possible participation permitted by 
their status, the Council went as far at Kirchberg 
as to grant associate members the same guaran-
tees of aid and assistance as to the member states. 
However, faced with the difficulty of extending 
the application of Article V of the Brussels Treaty 
to associate members, the Council resorted to a 
stratagem. The difficulties were due to the fact 
that granting military assistance to an associate 
member might, under the constitutional system of 
certain members, require the intervention of their 
respective parliaments, which might not perceive 
the international obligations of the state concer-
ned in the same way as the Council, in the absence 
of an act of ratification of the status of associate 
member of WEU 7• Thus provision was made for 
any associate member subject to aggression to be 
assisted by WEU members on the basis of Article 
5 of the Washington Treaty, although the obliga-
tion to assist in the event of aggression is not iden-
7. Yet, following the International Court of Justice, internal 
constitutional considerations have relative importance. Chal-
lenges to the compulsory value of an international 
commitment based on its inconstitutionality are rejected. For 
the Court, the intention expressed by a party to commit itself 
prevails over provisions in force in its constitution (see the 
abovementioned judgment in the case between Qatar and 
Bahrein dated I st July 1994, paragraph 24 ). 
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tical in both cases, but the obligation to provide 
assistance in face of aggression being identical, 
the final source still being Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter. This is an example of the tech-
nique of referral which, by the use of an inclusive 
reference, allows a text other than the one which 
should be applied to be used in determining the 
applicable rule 8• 
39. This represents a major effort at conver-
gence, not to mention unification of full and asso-
ciate member statuses in a highly sensitive area -
that of security guarantees. Thus, by operating, 
not at a formal level, which, under certain consti-
tutions, would have required signature of a diplo-
matic instrument subject to ratification, but at a 
practical one, that of providing assistance, the 
desired result is achieved. 
Moreover the Council was fully em-
powered, through the referral procedure, to 
extend the provisions of Article V of the Brussels 
Treaty to the WEU associate members, from the 
moment it had acquired powers to " consider mat-
ters concerning the execution of the treaty ". 
Under this provision of Article VIII of the treaty, 
it is not a matter of purely and simply applying the 
treaty, but of questions concerning such applica-
tion, which goes far beyond the text itself. 
40. Taking the process of assimilation of the 
two statuses still further on a practical level, at 
Kirchberg the Council also re-affirmed its will 
fully to take into consideration the security inter-
ests of associate members. This decision affects 
the preventive phase should associate members be 
victims of aggression. It recognises, implicitly but 
clearly, the ability to convene the Council to 
consult with regard to any threat to peace (Article 
VID.3 of the Brussels Treaty). 
41. Clearly this provision is directed only 
towards consultation between the contracting par-
ties to the Brussels Treaty which should not 
involve the associate members. However such a 
literal interpretation need not necessarily apply 
once relations between the said parties have be-
come organisational and cease to be exclusively 
contractual. WEU associate members are part of 
these organisational relations. The combination of 
the Rome decisions (the document plus the 
minutes providing in particular for the possibility 
of making proposals in accordance with the prin-
ciple of full participation in Council meetings) 
and the Kirchberg decisions on including the 
security interests of the associate members in the 
8. Although at Kirchberg the ministers obviously did not 
expressly and formally state that Article 5 of the Treaty of 
Washington was applicable to associate members as a com-
ponent of their status, they nevertheless gave a clear hint in 
stating that the security guarantees of the Treaty of Washing-
ton and of the Brussels Treaty were mutually and fully rein-
forcing not only in relations between members themselves 
but also between the latter and associate members. 
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objectives pursued in the Council's action, in 
accordance with Article VIII. I of the treaty, 
should enable associate members to exercise the 
ability provided for in Article Vlll.3 to convene 
the Council to consult with regard to any threat to 
peace. Any other interpretation seeking to reserve 
this ability to the contracting parties alone (the 
full members) might, moreover, prove unrealistic 
and of no practical value. Indeed, in the event of 
such a threat, it would always be possible for an 
associate member to approach a fairly understan-
ding full member to convene the Council and, at 
the ensuing meeting, submit its proposals. 
42. The above developments on the participa-
tion of associate members in the Council's work 
are presented in order to provide a certain refer-
ence for the defmition of associate member status 
in the Assembly. However, the Assembly's work 
on the status of associate members there, as set out 
in the report dated 3rd November 1993 (Document 
1390) clearly led the Council of Ministers to sug-
gest, at its Kirchberg meeting, a reappraisal of the 
direction taken, the more so since, as the Assem-
bly is itself aware (see Document 1416 dated lOth 
May 1994), this had raised extreme displeasure 
among certain associate members (paragraph 9). It 
is to be noted that at Kirchberg, the ministers, out 
of consideration for the Assembly, did not wish to 
request it to undertake such a reappraisal. The 
governments preferred to invite the Assembly to 
do so " through its national delegations ". This 
raises the question of the parliamentary Assem-
bly's room for manreuvre in this respect. 
43. Several points of law need to be taken into 
account in defining the status of representatives of 
associate members in the Assembly: first the rights 
deriving from the parliamentary functions exer-
cised by the Assembly which have enabled it to 
give itself a charter. The aforementioned functions 
are not those of a national parliament nor of a " 
supranational " parliament such as the European 
parliament. Suffice it to say in this connection that 
the WEU Assembly is the equivalent of the parlia-
mentary assembly of an intergovernmental organi-
sation, for example that of the Council of Europe. 
This likeness is the more valid as the WEU parlia-
mentarians are the same persons as those of the 
Council of Europe. The Assembly is an " organ of 
Western European Union" (second paragraph of 
the Preamble to the Charter). It is undoubtedly the 
organisation's parliamentary body. As in any orga-
nisation described as intergovernmental, there is a 
principal organ with responsibility for the execu-
tion 9 of the founding treaty, the budget and what 
may be termed the organisation's external rela-
tions, each of the other organs retaining the auto-
nomy inherent in their functions (parliamentary, 
juridical, technical etc.). 
9. Also the interpretation, application and revision of the 
founding documents of the organisation. 
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44. The Council of Ministers has responsibility 
for settling questions relating to associate member 
status in the light of the changes brought about in 
the relations between the Brussels Treaty powers. 
In the absence of provisions for an associate mem-
ber status in the organisation's founding instru-
ment, such status is governed by a form of" prae-
torian " law, through decisions of the Council of 
Ministers. However these decisions are limited to 
the status of representatives of associate members 
in the Council and its subsidiary organs and the 
Council has refrained from interfering in the oper-
ation of the Assembly out of respect for the latter's 
autonomy, as it has formally acknowledged. 
45. There are rules for the guidance of the 
Assembly which constitute the point of departure 
for defining the status of associate parliamenta-
rians. They stem from the " praetorian " law of the 
association regime and are of general application 
and not specifically to any given organ of WEU. 
There are texts which have been adopted by the 
Council of Ministers as WEU's principal organ. 
They, or at least some of them, are intended for the 
organisation as a whole. They are well known: 
those adopted at Maastricht, Petersberg, Rome and 
Kirchberg in as much as they are not specifically 
concerned with any particular WEU organ. 
Among these texts, the subject of ministerial 
declarations in the four cities mentioned, there are 
certain provisions for WEU as a whole which 
apply to the Assembly, even in its defmition of the 
status of the parliamentarians appointed to sit in 
the Assembly by the associate members of the 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (or to other 
parliamentary representatives); and this despite 
Article IX of the Brussels Treaty which limits the 
composition of the WEU Assembly to parliamen-
tary representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers 
to the Assembly of the Council of Europe. By 
ministerial declarations, such as Maastricht and 
Kirchberg, WEU's principal organ has adopted 
measures and concluded agreements with the 
member states described as " associate ". The 
Assembly cannot just ignore these by not admit-
ting their parliamentarians to its deliberations, the 
more so since the Council has, for its part, admit-
ted to its fold ministers from associate member 
countries. By virtue of their presence they have the 
right to speak and vote. The Assembly cannot 
therefore create a status which would result in the 
parliamentarians of associate members being 
excluded from its deliberations. Their participation 
might be different, and differentiated, from that of 
full members. However, in the main, the Assembly 
has to follow, although exceptions may be made 
which do not call the principle into question. 
46. The ministerial declarations also cannot be 
ignored because they are central to the aims of 
WEU. Through this association, it is intended to 
pursue the progressive integration of Europe and 
to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic 
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Alliance. To the extent that the status of associate 
member in the Assembly for allied European 
states fails to serve this purpose, it cannot be 
considered as in conformity with the law of the 
organisation. 
47. To exclude parliamentarians from the asso-
ciate members of the WEU Assembly would be to 
fail to acknowledge the Council of Minister's 
powers under Article VIII of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty. One could not proceed to interpret 
Article IX literally while failing to take account of 
the powers contained in new Article VIII. It is in 
application of the same Article VIII that the 
ministerial decisions contained in the aforemen-
tioned declarations have been taken and they are 
valid for all WEU bodies. 
48. According to the Maastricht declaration, 
associate member status must be such as to allow 
full participation in WEU activities. Such full.par-
ticipation has been achieved in the Council of 
Ministers, in accordance with the forms and pro-
cedures set out in the Rome document. Hence this 
full participation must also fmd expression in the 
associate member status the Assembly is called 
upon to establish. 
To refuse the parliamentarians of associate 
members the right to vote, i.e. to speak and vote, 
would be tantamount to refusing the full partici-
pation of parliamentarians of associate members 
in its proceedings. To what extent does the status 
worked out by its Committee on Rules of Proce-
dure and Privileges in 1993 and 1994 reflect this 
requirement for fullness? Put another way, what 
are the statutory restrictions placed on the regime 
of parliamentarians of associate members that 
would accurately reflect the difference between 
member and associate member, given the require-
ment for voting rights in a parliamentary body? 
49. The Council of Ministers had foreseen cer-
tain restrictions on participation of Ministers of 
associate countries in its work. The Assembly 
might therefore draw on thi~ example ~bile 
taking account of the fact that m the Council the 
unanimity rule applies, whereas in the Assembly 
there is no right of veto or requirement for unani-
mity, all decisions being on the basis of a major-
ity, absolute or relative. A dominant role, incom-
patible with the associate status of members 
termed associate in the Council of Ministers, as a 
result of their right of veto, was considered as 
excessive, and excluded. In the Assembly there is 
no v~o to exclude. The Council had the more rea-
son to be restrictive given that it is a principal 
body of the organisation with responsibility for 
questions that are vital to its members, with 
powers that are both executive and " legislative " 
exercised on behalf ofthe organisation as a whole. 
12 
APPENDIX 
The Assembly having no such powers, the 
proposed restrictions on the rights of associate 
members therefore seem difficult to justify. 
50. Indeed, the Assembly is not a principal 
body and its powers are consultative, despite its 
political importance. Reference to the regime in 
the Council of Ministers would therefore seem to 
be necessary, given the respective powers of the 
two WEU bodies. 
51. Another reference by way of information 
for the Assembly in defining the status of parlia-
mentarians of associate members is provided by 
that of the parliamentarians of states associated 
with the Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
Reference to this latter is instructive. Indeed, the 
parliamentarians of associate members are part of 
the composition of the Assembly and have the 
same rights as the parliamentarians of full mem-
bers (see Article 5.b of the statute of the Council 
of Europe). Associate members do not participate 
and are not represented in the Committee of 
Ministers 10 but in the Assembly they are represen-
ted on an equal footing with full members. This 
precedent of the Council of Europe, although not 
legally binding on the WEU Assembly, cannot not 
be taken into consideration as a reference by the 
WEU Assembly in its political assessments. It is 
of course for the Assembly to assess whether it is 
politically timely to allow associate members 
voting rights, but it must also take account of the 
requirement of the rule of full participation for 
them. 
52. An initial interpretation of this made in 
Document 1390 was not approved by the minis-
ters who wished the matter to be examined fur-
ther. A second interpretation, given in Document 
1416, could not be adopted for lack of the neces-
sary quorum. Moreover the parliamentary debates 
took place concomitantly with those of the minis-
ters and therefore in ignorance of the latter. Can 
the request for re-examination although n~t 
addressed directly to the Assembly but commum-
cated to it (Assembly Document 1422) remain 
outside its discussions, bearing in mind its auto-
nomy? The implications of that autonomy and the 
political importance of the parliamentary func-
tions of its members do not allow the legal analyst 
to offer strictly legal conclusions on the basis of 
which the Assembly would have to reach a deci-
sion on the question raised, while the latter also 
acts in accordance with a policy conceived within 
the context of its political autonomy vis-a-vis the 
ministers. 
53. However this may be, a new factor has to 
be taken into account in any legal and political 
analysis, namely the exercise by the ministers of 
the powers conferred on them by Article VIII of 
10. Associate member status is provided for international 
bodies with limited sovereignty. 
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the Brussels Treaty in new fields and to an extent 
unequalled in the past. The Maastricht, Peters-
berg, Rome and Kirchberg declarations undoub-
tedly demonstrate in the clearest possible way the 
will of the Council of Ministers to build a new 
European architecture, taking account both of the 
evolution of the European Union and its identity 
requirements and that of the Atlantic Alliance and 
the over-riding concern to preserve it. The Coun-
cil has therefore been able to exercise all the res-
ponsibilities and competencies belonging to it as 
an authority empowered to consider not only the 
application of the treaty but also matters concern-
ing its application and obviously its interpretation, 
in accordance with well established juridical prac-
tice. 
54. Strengthening the security of the Brussels 
Treaty powers would certainly be among the aims 
to which the exercise of these responsibilities 
newly attributed to it by the 1954 protocol might 
be directed. The 1948 treaty had provided the 
Council with the powers of a diplomatic confe-
rence, enabling it to consult on all matters dealt 
with under that treaty. Moreover, the 1954 Coun-
cil acquired the power to consider " the progress-
ive integration of Europe ". Its powers were thus 
widened to the whole of Europe. Under these 
conditions, all action taken by it to offer a status, 
not foreseen by the treaty, to states that are not 
signatories of the Brussels Treaty, is entirely in 
accordance with its wider territorial and functio-
nal powers. 
55. To this enlargement must also be added the 
change in the legal nature of the Council, which 
first became ministerial and subsequently ceased 
to be " consultative " as it had been in the text of 
Article VII of the 1948 Brussels Treaty. The 
Council, created by the 1954 protocol is empowe-
red to take binding decisions on behalf of the 
contracting parties, without having to resort to the 
procedure of drafting and ratifying a new interna-
tional agreement, supplementing and modifying 
the previous one, i.e. the Brussels Treaty. These 
new powers were discharged for the first time in 
1959, when WEU ceased to exercise its functions 
in social and cultural matters in favour of the 
Council of Europe. 
56. A further change in the nature of the Coun-
cil occurred with the creation of an international 
organisation, called WEU, of which the Council 
became the principal organ. This status of princi-
pal organ is expressed, in particular, by the fact 
that it became the supervisory body of the Arma-
ments Agency which it was mandated to create 
and was required to present an annual report to an 
Assembly which had no right to censure it but 
could only adopt opinions and recommendations. 
Thus, in accordance with the law of intergovern-
mental organisations, it obtained the competence 
attributed to the principal organ of the organisa-
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tion. As such, the Council recognised the auto-
nomy of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU, 
deriving from the nature of its functions. 
57. The Council, as principal organ, acquired 
the necessary powers to create (or generate) subsi-
diary or non subsidiary bodies (Agency for the 
Control of Armaments) whose legal nature is wor-
thy of overall consideration. Therefore, with its 
wider territorial powers, extending to states not 
signatories of the Brussels Treaty, its power to take 
obligatory, binding decisions which are both exe-
cutive and " legislative " and its status as principal 
organ of WEU, it was possible for it to establish an 
associate member status, with rights and duties, in 
the legal order both internal and external to WEU. 
58. Consequently it would seem questionable 
to maintain that the " document " and " declara-
tions " are political texts not enforceable in regard 
to the Assembly. The Brussels Treaty has doubt-
less not been revised in accordance with a revi-
sion procedure which, furthermore, was not pro-
vided for, but which could possibly be followed 
by applying the theory of the contrary act. 
It was possible for the Council to create an 
associate member status in full conformity with 
the Brussels Treaty. This status is binding on all 
the governments and all the national parliaments 
of the Brussels Treaty powers. It is what might be 
termed a right derived from the 1954 modified 
Brussels Treaty and, as such, subject always to 
certain peculiarities linked with the derived nature 
of this right, it produces the same legal effects as 
the Brussels Treaty. These effects are enforceable 
in the states known as the Brussels Treaty powers 
and their parliaments and in other WEU bodies, 
from the moment they are grounded in the powers 
granted to the Council of Ministers in the protocol 
signed in Paris in 1954 and these powers have 
been exercised in accordance with the ends for the 
purpose of which they were granted, namely to 
strengthen the security (of the Brussels Treaty 
powers), promote the unity and encourage the 
progressive integration of Europe (see Article 
VIII.1 of the 1954 modified Brussels Treaty). 
59. Associate member status undeniably fulfils 
the purposes assigned to the exercise of the 
powers granted to the Council of Ministers fol-
lowing the revision of the Brussels Treaty. 
Indeed, it strengthens the security of the 
Brussels Treaty powers; it promotes the unity of 
Europe and encourages its progressive integra-
tion, in other words that of all the allied European 
states that are not signatories of the Brussels 
Treaty. Furthermore, a progressive process could 
not be achieved through rules fixed (ne variatur) 
by the treaty but through successive decisions 
adopted by an authority or institution of the orga-
nisation, empowered to act thus. This is achieved 
since the associate members reaffirmed at the 
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same time as the WEU member states (in the 
declaration made in Rome and included in the 
preamble of the document signed there on 20th 
November 1992) the commitments which bind 
their countries in order to ensure peace and secu-
rity in Europe. There is no better way of repeating 
the first paragraph of Article VIII.1 of the Brus-
sels Treaty. 
Conclusions 
60. a. The various decisions of the Council of 
Ministers incorporated in the Maastricht, Peters-
berg, Rome and Kirchberg declarations and partly 
given substance in the " document " signed in 
Rome, provide an adequate legal foundation for any 
possible decision by the Assembly to allow the par-
ticipation of parliamentary representatives of the 
associate members ofWEU. To this end the Assem-
bly has no need to implement any formal revision 
procedure of the 1954 modified Brussels Treaty. 
b. The Assembly may base any decision it 
reaches not on a literal interpretation of Article IX 
of the aforementioned treaty but rather on the suc-
cessive decisions of the Council referred to above, 
adopted in accordance with Article VIII of the 
treaty. The explanatory interpretation of Article 
IX which seems to prevail among certain mem-
bers is clearly in contradiction with present-day 
international law as handed down by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. According to that body, 
charters of international organisations must be 
interpreted dynamically and teleologically, taking 
account of the powers inherent in the organs of the 
latter (see Case: Certain expenditure, 1962, para-
graph 157). 
c. Voting rights granted to parliamentary 
representatives of associate members are based on 
the principle of full participation by associate 
members in the actions and work of WEU. This 
principle governs associate member status in the 
various WEU organs, subject to possible excep-
tions and differentiations. The right to speak and 
vote of representatives of associate members may 
not be counted among permissible derogations, as 
the report adopted by the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges moreover recognised 
(Document 1390). Indeed, there are two fundamen-
tal parts to a presence in a deliberative body 11 : 
debate plus vote. There is no participation in the 
deliberation of such a body without intervention in 
debates and in voting, two operations which mark a 
presence inside and not outside the Assembly. The 
11. Article IX of the Brussels Treaty is <'lllite brief regarding 
the mission of the Assembly. As an indication in this respect, 
one might refer to Article 22 of the statute of the Council of 
Europe which defines its Parliamentary Assembly as a deli-
berative organ of the Council. The identity of representatives 
from one Assembly to the other authorises this reference as 
guidance for analysing the status of the Assembly ofWEU. 
14 
APPENDIX 
latter is the case of observers, whereas the former is 
that of members of the Assembly. If the status of a 
parliamentary representative of an associate mem-
ber of the organisation allows him to sit in the 
Assembly, this presence does not need to be identi-
cal to that of the representatives of full members. 
The difference is de jure. The extent of differences 
or derogations is determined in accordance with 
political and parliamentary considerations. Such 
considerations are at the discretion of the WEU 
Assembly. It is an autonomous but not separate 
body. In international organisations, the parliamen-
tary body is not a separate power in face of the prin-
cipal organ. Yet compared with the other organs in 
face of the principal organ, it is an organ that has 
autonomy that the others do not have. This auto-
nomy stems from its composition and its function. 
Because of its parliamentary composition, the 
Assembly can only operate as a supervisory body 
and one of moral censure. Its task is to translate the 
opinion of the national parliaments as a whole on 
the question under discussion as expressed through 
their delegations. 
The autonomy of the Assembly allows it to 
determine, discretionarily and independantly of 
the decisions of the Council of Ministers, the 
regime of the parliamentarians of associate mem-
bers in its forum with differences that may not be 
those retained by the Council for the participation 
of ministers of associate members in its own 
work. Thus a certain number of differentiations 
retained in the draft decision of the Committee on 
Rules of Procedure of the Assembly (Document 
1390), those set out in section 11 (paragraph 3, 
sub-paragraph 3.6) for defining the principle for 
the participation of associate members in the acti-
vities of the Assembly may be based on the auto-
nomy of the Assembly. This is so as long as the 
essential aspect of participation in the deliberative 
power has not been challenged. Likewise, the 
Assembly cannot insist on the status of represen-
tatives in the Assembly of the Council of Europe 
among the representatives of associate members 
who sit in that body. If the identity of representa-
tion in the two Assemblies risks not being obser-
ved, the identical number of representatives of 
associate members may also be set aside. Howe-
ver, this numerical differentiation could not be 
deemed to be discrimination between associate 
members or between the latter and full members. 
This might be the case in the event of significant 
differences in relation to the representations in the 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
Conversely, no juridical basis can be seen 
for refusing the participation of parliamentarians 
of associate members in voting on opinions and 
recommendations of the Assembly. 
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